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Abstract 
Research in changes to the institutional environment has set a scientific problem of a balance between 
consequences from such changes and a need to sort out differences across imperfect standards and regulations. 
Approaches to solve the abovementioned issue are not the same. In a review of scientific papers, we present an 
original view of scientists, who are committed to the Russian academic tradition. To clarify this, the paper 
summarizes theories on the efficiency of economic agents and institutions. The paper also demonstrates 
ambiguity in approaches to a definition of efficiency conditions. It justifies factors of an increase or a decrease in 
transaction costs in a horizontal and vertical institutional expansion, as well as a change to the transformational 
function. In the course of the research, existing saturation and sparsity as features of the institutional 
environment are discussed.  
Keywords: economic agent efficiency, institutional efficiency, saturation and sparsity of the institutional 
environment, borders of economic agents, institutional changes 
1. Introduction 
Stable and sustainable economic development in many respects depends on to what extent its institutional 
framework is able to face challenges from erroneous fluctuations or more precisely from errors and conflicts that 
appear when one follows a path of seemingly proper behaviour. Any imperfection in institutions, which 
determine rules and regulations of an organizational character, necessarily results in a need in their reforms. 
Otherwise, institutional standards can produce traps of irrational behaviour. Frequency and fundamentality of 
reforms within the institutional system relates to the efficiency of existing institutions, their ability to inspire 
self-organizational development mechanisms. Changes to behaviour rules and standards of economic agents, as 
well as their interaction lead to a special kind of uncertainty, called vartational (Note 1). Being outside the 
typical environment uncertainty, decision-making and their consequences, the vartational uncertainty 
demonstrates a possible saltation of the economic system.  
An evaluation of whether changes are reasonable relates to a check whether economic agents work efficiently 
and how their efficiency influences the efficiency of institutions. A level of possible changes broadly depends on 
that. Ambiguous circumstances of represented efficiency set a relevant scientific objective to clarify efficiency 
criteria. It is in solving the mentioned issue where we summarize existing ideas of the efficiency and make an 
attempt to find out factors and processes of an institutional change. In the Russian academic tradition, there has 
been a prevailing assumption that a criterion for the efficiency in institution functioning in particular, and in the 
institutional environment as a whole is minimization of transaction costs, e.g. Inshakov (2002) and Frolov (2011), 
Kuz'minov, Bendukidze and Yudkevich (2005; 2006). Such view of the issue is highly controversial. There are 
also important observations in this regard in their papers, but there are no explicit references to another idea of 
institutional efficiency criteria. From time to time, as opposed to academic tenets of the institutionalism (D. 
North, O. Williamson), scientists argue for ideas of a different sense, where the efficiency of institutions is a 
result of minimized transaction costs or even optimized transaction costs within normal limits. While 
assumptions concerning the norm in transaction costs have their productive academic solution (as evidenced 
from available publications), then the minimization of costs, to our mind, cannot and should not act as a criterion 
for the institutional efficiency. After all, the main purpose of institutions is their evolutionary role as a guarantor 
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of a sustainable economic system, the controllability over an organizational mechanism, of structuring in social 
and economic interaction, as a result of which the uncertainty goes down. It is this hypothesis, which was 
discussed in detail in a course of the research in a comparative analysis of conclusions made by scientists, who 
had adhered to the Russian academic tradition. Conclusions that follow the arguments have allowed to come to a 
figurative idea of institutional transformations made with concepts of saturation and sparsity. 
2. Literature Review 
The main research question is in understanding and a correct interpretation of the efficiency category. Available 
various interpretations in a definition distort ideas of its meaning as applied separately to economic agents and 
institutions. An example of a “general rule” is Chernikov’s (2004) statement. In his effort to prove a new 
methodology paradigm to explore social interactions, he says of a condition for the efficiency. It might be 
described as follows, “the lower transformation and transaction costs are, the better the basic welfare source is 
used, that is, the higher a degree of non-equivalence is in exchange interaction between the collective human 
subject (the society) and the welfare source”.  
Considering the efficiency in the light of the self-organization theory, in his research Sammeck (2011) mentions that, 
“given a certain benefit from the assured self-regulation (regarding the economic agent - AN), it can be said that 
the more transformational costs are, the less there are incentives for a company to contribute into 
self-organization”. To our mind, from the assumption one can additionally conclude that the self-organization 
introduced by J. Sammeck as a continuous movement towards an ideal organizational system, requires a 
minimum of acceptable transformation costs. However, we are inclined to believe that making a relationship 
between a figure of costs for changes and the self-organization feature is not truly correct. From the point of 
view of organizational changes, the optimality, and along with it the effeciency of the economic agent as Crase 
and Gandhi (2009) think, can be defineded with “minimizing a sum of all transaction ... and transformation costs 
(costs for static transformations, technological transition costs and intertemporal expenses for transformations)”.  
Having imagined the contrary thing, saying that a function of institutions instead of economic agents is a 
minimization of transaction costs (Rudenkov, 2010), it would be difficult to explain a permanent growth in a 
transaction sector of the economy. Then we could say that such an increase in transaction costs suggests that in 
the developed countries for a long time of their existence, institutions have continuously lost their efficiency. 
Nevertheless, it is not the case. A progress in economic and social relations has objectively led to an 
enhancement in their role. A confirmation for a controversial nature of the contrary assumption can also be found 
in G. Litvintseva’s paper, where the scientist recognizes that “minimization of transaction costs can be hardly 
regarded as a common criterion of the institutional efficiency. This is the only way to achieve economic and 
social goals” (Litvintseva, 2003). Hence, figuratively speaking, institutions, functioning from transaction costs, 
“consuming” them and living from them do not set their mind on reducing them. Without transaction costs 
institutions are consigned to a death in a decay of institutional order where chaos and anarchy in behaviors of 
economic subjects reduce chances for exchange, a few stable for the parties in their rights security. Any 
emerging institutional imperative norm obviously leads to increasing overall transaction costs among economic 
agents. The situation when one imperative norm is overlaid or overlapped with another leads to increasing 
transaction costs to an even great degree. 
Thus, the efficiency of the economic agent with numerous essential perceptions of transformation and 
transaction costs is achieved with their acceptable and limited minimization. Herein, there is an obvious limit for 
minimization seen by us as nothing else but a norm in a sense. However, the factor, with which the economic 
agent is considered efficient, can not yet be applied to the efficiency of the institutional environment.  
Transaction costs, as defined above, are an integral part of the economic system, where there is an economic 
exchange in some way. Hence, both institutions, and economic agents in their convergence take part in 
“self-generation” of transaction costs. D. North had distinguished signs of this phenomenon in his research and 
stated that with a relatively high degree of certainty “like institutions, organizations define a structure of 
relationships between people. Indeed, if you analyze costs arising from existing institutional framework, you can 
see that costs do not only depend on that framework for their emergence, but also on organisations...” (North, 
1990).  
Russian scientists Kouzminov, Bendukidze and Yudkevich (2005; 2006) point out to the “ambigously interpreted 
institutional benefit” whatever criteria we apply. They reasonably point out that “one may consider the 
institution as a framework, within which transaction costs are minimized, and hence evaluate the institution with 
these criteria. But the matter is that the institution is able to ensure local minimization of transaction costs 
producing the global inefficiency at the same time”. 
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It would be more valid to assume that both the statement and solving the question on efficiency of the 
institutional environment should go from the fact that with an increase in transaction costs, aimed at 
institutional benefits, the efficiency of institutions would necessarily increase. The same increase in costs with an 
unchanged amount of other expenses for the economic agent or the organizational and economic system would 
have an opposite effect - its efficiency would decrease. Therefore we need to make a difference between the 
efficincy for both sides, i.e. firstly, for institutions, and secondly, for actors within the organizational and 
economic system. 
We believe that it would be quite groundless to try to confuse these questions, suggesting that the efficiency of 
institutions depends on the efficiency of economic agents. However, some researchers apparently take this as 
their point of departure. As an example, let us refer to Rudenkov's (2010) statement saying that “the institution 
should minimize them (transaction costs - AN) to the level required to maintain the institution existence”.  
Maevski (2001) in his study states that “the more efficient in the evolution the economic institutions are, the 
more they contribute into the increase (Inshakov & Frolov, 2002) transaction costs”. This conclusion can be 
partly acceptable, but only to the extent that transaction costs in the evolutionary dynamics of development have 
been actually increasing. As for current trends of interaction in the society, there is a statement by Moiseev (1998) 
saying that “the more complex the system gets, the more difficult for us, wherein exponentially, it is to 
coordinate functioning of all its elements. And that means that there is an increasing trend towads a loss in 
sustainability, and going to the homeostasis border”. It would seem that transactions are indeed such an indicator 
of difficulties in coordination aimed at reducing the uncertainty, caused by them. 
Attempts to measure the efficiency of institutions using the dynamics in transaction costs of economic agents are 
not fruitful (Note 2). It is clear that “an amount of transaction and transformation costs is important in an 
empirical comparison of organizations” (Crase & Gandhi, 2009). Minimized total costs are only one 
manifestation of the efficiency, i.e. the efficiency of economic agents. At the same time, an aim of institutions is 
to establish the “rules of the game”, formal and informal institutional constraints, hence, to arrange the 
interaction between actors (North, 1990). With their own existence, institutions reduce the uncertainty, 
structuring the everyday life, i.e. “these uncertainties arise due to both the complexity of challenges themselves 
demanding their solution, and “programs” to solve them ... This statement should not be understood as saying 
that institutions are always effective” (Ibid.). Thus, an assessment of the efficiency in institution functioning 
should not be focused on a change to transaction costs, but on the assessment of the uncertainty, levelled by 
institutions, and then to identify to what extent they produce effective norms and imperatives in the economy. 
Coming back to V. Majewski’s concept, it should be noted that his ideas was further developed by Inshakov and 
Frolov (2002). Taking Maevski’s conclusion for granted, they again say on its incorrectness, - “a general increase 
in transaction costs within the economic system is an indicator of ongoing evolution, subject to relative 
minimization of these costs by individual institutions in a short term” (Inshakov & Frolov, 2002). We consider a 
refining note on the indicative nature of transaction cost dynamics quite useful. Indeed, increasing cumulative 
transaction costs in the economics may be due to at least two factors. Their research establishes a research 
methodology in a description of imagined institutional transformations. 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Factor to Measure the Institutional Environment 
Firstly, let us mention the horizontal and/or vertical expansion of the institutional environment. Emerging “rules of 
the game” producing the vartational uncertainty of the system is a sign of the horizontal expansion (Kuzmin, 
2012). New modified imperative norm even within the existing institutional system leads to a situation where 
economic agents to avoid an influence of the vartational uncertainty, have to bear additional transaction costs, 
consolidating and affirming each time the very existence of such institutions. A process of imperative norm 
making that later produce individual terms and conditions, as it seems to us, is an indicator of institutional 
evolution. 
The vertical expansion of the institutional environment goes in response to the insufficiency of existing 
institutions, i.e. that valid “rules of the game” require considering new circumstances. Building institutions able 
to localize and structure the uncertainty of those circumstances is a sign of internal self-organization of the 
organisational mechanism. Because the socio-economic interaction includes the uncertainty of various types, we 
can say that sophistication of the interaction leads to the uncertainty achieving a certain critical level. A desire of 
the organizational and economic system to support its existence makes economic agents take counter-measures, 
establishing new institutions. 
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As for the evolutionary aspect, the vertical expansion is a prototype of the extensive society development, which 
with its increasing capacity and complexity is inevitable. At the same time, establishing new institutions does not 
encourage a decrease in transaction costs of economic agents. We assume that a consequence from both 
horizontal and vertical expansion will be a fact that transaction costs in fractional and absolute calculus will 
steadily increase throughout a life of the economic system. Short and long-term cycles of the system 
development should not influence overall trends in transaction cost dynamics, as the momentary decrease in the 
uncertainty at various development stages in the future would be neutralized with its “global growth”. 
Describing the horizontal expansion of the institutional environment, one can observe that with provisional 
inalterability of institutions in their number such development in the evolutionary aspect is intense. However, 
natural opportunities to intensify institutions are limited. Therefore, in the long-term both vertical, and horizontal 
expansion are regularly manifested in the evolution and do not substitute for each other. 
Including a time factor in processes of the expanding institutional environment, we see as evident that there is an 
available three-plane model of institutional evolution (Figure 1). Separating ourselves from a variety of 
institutional forms, we believe that the whole evolution process we can represent as a development thread that 
moves in time from the side where the horizontal expansion prevails to the vertical one and vice versa, never 
being in a static parity of those two types of transformation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Model of the evolutionary institutional expansion 
 
3.2 Change Factor for a Transformation Core of the Economic Agent 
Secondly, an increasing cumulative value of transaction costs in the economics may be a consequence from 
improved transformational and endogenous transactional functions in the economic agent. The earlier observed 
interaction between transformation and transaction costs suggests that improvements in internal processes among 
economic entities owing to technologies can reduce total cost of production, which is quite a well-known fact 
and does not require any confirmation. 
Under the conditions when the change to the exogenous transactional function in the economics takes place 
influenced by the horizontal and vertical expansion of the institutional environment, the rest of it - its 
endogenous function may change independent of the exogenous component and lead to the decrease in overall 
transaction costs without obvious institutional evolution. 
It is time to pay attention to technologies themselves. Some scientists regard that technologies, both as tangible 
tools to make changes, and incremental intangible knowledge and skills, are a sort of “product” of institutional 
activities Skiba (2010), Kuznetsova (2008) – Applied Research Institute; Nukulina (2009), Akulich (2010), 
Taratushkin (2004) – Basic Research Institute; Popov (2011) – Institute of Innovative Organizations, Institute for 
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Technology Transfer (Op. cit.), and many others.  
However, at the same time, institutions do not make technologies, they only provide for their establishment. The 
main source for technologies has been still an economically active individual. Herewith the institution evolution 
status can stay unchanged: the institution structure will be constant and incentives for its horizontal or vertical 
expansion may not appear at all. There will be a certain “status quo” when the institutional structure will meet 
demands and needs of the organizational and economic system at the given level of technology and social 
development. However, a desire among economic agents to optimize their operations at the expence of internal 
capacities will result in a situation when minimizing production costs (as manifestation of adaptation) faces its 
internal conflicts that is simultaneously eliminated competitive motivation and a need in the competition as such 
to ensure an economic exchange with a maximized result. It is when this tension escalates, that stimuli for the 
institutional expansion become more obvious. 
4. Discussion 
In an organic unity of scientific approaches to identify a role of consituents forming a ratio in transaction costs, it 
is possible to emphasize a number of features in directive factors and consecutive manifestations of costs. There 
is an interesting paper by Light and Rosenstein (1995). They present an idea that “external transaction 
costs…contribute into bureaucratization when entrepreneurs avoid incurring external costs by means of 
transaction internationalization”. Avoiding prescribed rules, standards and behaviour mechanisms leads to the 
expansion of the institutional structure, makes new instruments in the form of both sanctions for violating 
accepted practices, and new institutions and imperative norms, which are supposed to return the economic 
system to its previous more sustainable and specific position. At the same time, the institutional expansion 
generally leads to increasing transaction costs. However, in line with the institutional tradition, Acheson (1986) 
mentions that inefficient markets make companies opt for bureaucracy than market coordination, and this relates 
to the assumption by I. Light and C. Rosenstein. Herewith it is geeting clear that with institutional saturation of 
the environment at a level higher than conventionally optimal one, which should be adequate to the quality of 
economic agents, their needs and requirements to regulated interaction mechanism, transaction costs increase, 
while the institutional efficiency decreases that Sukharev (2012) also observes in his research. It's worth taking 
into account an ideological conceptual conflict identified does not result in its proper logical solution. 
It is worth saying that the institutional saturation is opposed to the institutional sparsity, when quantitative and 
qualitative features of the current institutional space do not allow economic agents to carry out their activities 
with a proper return, as well as individuals as direct consumers of transactional benefits. And this reduces the 
efficiency of the institutional structure finctioning, and hence, of the economic mechanism of the system. Hence, 
the decrease and increase in the efficiency of the institutional field can occur in terms of both growth and 
reduction in a number of institutions, their integral imperative norms that constitute the nature of the institutional 
expansion and sparsity. Institutional saturation or sparsity can respectively lead to two multidirectional 
consequences. 
It is firstly viscosity of the environment, where the internal tension in an economic mechanism can be so high 
that the economic system might be destroyed or at least suffer its substantial transformation. Under the 
oppression of weight of its own institutions, a system-specific risk appears from functioning of institutions as 
such, as well as from norms that they introduce - an inevitable change to the “rules of the game” (the vartational 
uncertainty), which follows attenuating economic activity. To be more specific about relations between 
transaction costs, papers by Williamson (1985) are worthy of mention; who is widely considered the first to 
adhere to the modern institutionalism and who pointed out that transaction costs are “an economic equivalent to 
the tension in physical systems”. Like other researchers (Sukharev), we have convincingly proved that cost 
minimization, as well as tension levelling in the economy do not mean that the system or an institutional 
structure has become more efficient. Nevertheless, their efficiency demands a definition of the uncertainty 
assessment, which acts as a primary criterion, while the dynamics in transaction costs is in this regard a 
criterion of the secondary level. To our mind, when a result from functioning of an institution in particular or of 
an institutional structure in general, is equally uncertain as compared to another institutional arrangement 
(institutional alternative), then it is a difference in transaction costs between them, or a difference in costs 
between “old” and “new” institutions, that is a “barometer” of a change to the comparative efficiency, i.e. an 
indicator of the efficiency dynamics in institutional changes. 
Secondly, such sliding, oh, to be more accurate, slip, when between economic agents links, able to mutually 
restrain participants in barter operations, do not appear. In this regard, Sukharev (2012) is right, saying, “with a 
decrease in the total tension to zero, a motion itself will become problematic, while this task will not be 
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technically realistic”. Hence, the tension and viscosity of the environment are required, as well as sliding. 
However, the task is not reduced to a discrete definition of an end position, but a search for a balance between 
them. 
Herewith, it is important to understand that the absolute sliding (or slip) happens when the viscosity of the 
environment is not really in place, equally to the absolute tension, when the interaction mechanism becomes too 
cumbersome “for motion”. However, it is in extreme positions, where borders of actors take special 
characteristics. If in the case of the absolute sliding boundaries of the outer boundary become rigid and 
non-penetrable, then in the case of the absolute tension, outer "membrane" boundaries of the economic agent are 
significantly expanded and their permittivity is improved up to the subject’s inner edge, outlining the 
transformational function. To our mind, a ratio between internal and external transaction costs in this aspect 
shows a degree of strength and a scope of the borders’ permeability. 
It is obvious that rigid and non-penetrable borders say that all the transaction costs are concentrated inside of an 
organisation. Then the transformational function of the economic agent would become incapacitated due to 
missing opportunities for transformations due to self-closed “inputs” and “outputs”. Transactions, hence, would 
not be required. It appears that rigidity of an outer loop would lead to compression of an inner edge of the 
transformation function and sequence approximation of the external transaction boundary towards it (Figure 2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Boundaries of the economic agent in separating transaction costs 
 
A reverse situation appears in case of the absolute tension. It is noteworthy that the viscosity of the environment 
in case of the absolute tension is characterized with an increasing specific value of transaction costs of the 
economic agent caused by massiveness of institutions. An economic exchange begins to restrain, as a process of 
transaction-making becomes an excessively long due to various rules and regulations. At the same time, the 
absolute tension implies that the economic agent is not able to make transactions from the inside. As a result, the 
transformational and transactional functions in case of the absolute tension are not linked together with a single 
organizational structure. A clear distinction between sectors of the economy appears followed by appearance of a 
kind of two independent markets-the market of transaction operational benefits and the market of a final product 
of the transformation function. 
5. Conclusion 
Summarizing the findings, we can state that it is clear that the efficiency of economic agents cannot and should 
not replace that of institutions. Differences in the nature and essence of these objects lead to a conclusion that the 
efficiency of the institutional environment is set with that level of the uncertainty that responds to observing 
pre-defined rules, standards and behaviour mechanisms. Reforms to institutions to improve organizational 
practice are capable both to increase and decrease transaction costs. Their dynamics only evidences a number of 
qualitative characteristics of the institutional environment, and is unable to show a degree of efficiency in 
activities of institutions. The quantitative uncertainty performs this role and is faced by economic agents 
following a given institutional protocol. Its modification or a radical transformation is a starting point for a 
comparative definition of the dynamic efficiency of institutions. Herewith, the static of the institutional 
efficiency is not obvious. One can only talk about more or less effective institutional arrangement within the 
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system, even when a communication procedure was agreed at the beginning. It may seem a paradox, but 
coherence and internal consistency in rules and regulations for a proper behaviour is not a guarantee for missing 
uncertainty. On the contrary, its implementation would make another unpredictability and uncertainty, which 
influenced by the memory effect of a former institutional arrangement would present interaction errors. 
Updates to an institutional framework of the economic system are obviously associated with changes. As for 
fheir nature, we can refer to these changes as a horizontal and vertical institutional expansion. Where in one case, 
a number of institutions is expanded, while in the other-rules and regulations are improved. In these development 
aspects, we have noticed available related parameters of the institutional environment, i.e. saturation and sparsity. 
Arguments in this regard have allowed presenting a model of emerging boundaries of economic agents, where 
the main role is in differentiating endogenous and exogenous transaction costs. Thus, the completed research has 
partly deepened a scientific understanding of the institutional efficiency and processes of institutional changes.  
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Notes 
Note 1. In brief, the vartational uncertainty refers to the uncertainty in a change to the “rules of the game”. Errors 
from setting norms and mechanisms of institutional control against each other, missing or non-matched requests 
for control and responses to them are also included in a content of the vartational uncertainty. At the same time, 
the vartational uncertainty is not a substitute for the environment uncertainty. One needs to be aware of and see 
an essential difference between them: the vartational uncertainty does not include an aspect of a direct interaction 
between economic agents, while the environment uncertainty describes vagueness and uncertainty in behaviour 
of agents themselves. 
Note 2. A conventional error is possible for such assumptions, as there are indeed indirect indicators of the 
efficiency. However, it would be wrong to follow an argument that “the institutional environment is as efficient, 
as all the economic agents are efficient that are within it” (D. Frolov). We believe that a different argument 
would be correct, i.e. the institutional environment is as efficient, as all the institutions that make it are effective. 
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